When the Civil War ended, the US Army created six (later consolidated to four) African-American regiments, numbering about a quarter of the total of the post-war Army. Yet, when the US entered World War I, the Army saw fit to deploy those units along the southern border and the Philippines and to create two African American divisions and transfer 1,600 soldiers to their ranks: the 92nd Division under US command and the 93rd Division, which was parceled out to foreign command.
The division was organized in October 1917 at Camp Funston, Kansas, with African American soldiers from all states. Recruitment and training did not prepare them well for combat. They were given neither adequate bathing facilities or clean uniforms. With training dispersed, there was no common standard: some soldiers received full combat training, while others were only assigned menial duties. Initial efforts to train black officers faltered with the decision to rely on white officers, often southerners “who understood how to treat Negroes,” who regarded being assigned to black units as demeaning and ruinous to their careers. Under the command of Major General Charles Ballou, who condoned segregation “to support good order and discipline”, the 92nd arrived in France with the joining of separate parts which had never trained as a division before, so there was no unit cohesion. Upon arrival, they were first used as stevedores, then very limited combat training which delayed their deployment until June. Another purge of black officers was followed by again limited combat training, and it was not until the end of August that the 92nd was first sent to the St. Die sector in Lorraine, near the Rhine River, southeast of Metz. During their first action at the end of August, they successfully assaulted German positions and drove back counterattacks despite bombardment of 12,000 shells in 2 ½ hours. They were then shifted to patrolling until 20 September when ordered to the Argonne Forest. They arrived just on the eve of battle, with no time to acclimatize or gain familiarity with the rough, broken terrain. They lacked experience or training as a liaison unit. Headquarters failed to provide them with grenade launchers, signal flares, wire cutters, or maps and they had no specific objectives. The US artillery barrage failed to destroy heavily wired enemy positions, and they faced German heavy machine gun and artillery fire, plus huge craters from earlier fighting. Under terrible conditions in wooded terrain, one regiment broke and retreated in turmoil. Because of their perceived poor performance, the entire division was relieved and sent to a “quiet sector,” where their heavy patrolling resulted in 462 American casualties in one month. The division was ordered to assault heavily defended enemy heights on 10 November, again suffering over 500 American casualties, mostly from poison gas, during the unnecessary attack, as the Armistice was declared the next day. All other combat, combat support, and logistics units were praised; the 367th Regiment received a unit Croix de Guerre for their drive toward Metz and 57 members of division received the Distinguished Service Cross. Nevertheless, military authorities, especially white officers within the discredited 368th Regiment instituted a campaign to discredit their troops to push off blame for their own poor performance and explain units’ problems as “cowardly” behavior of black officers. During subsequent internal military trials, 30 African American officers were relieved from duty, and five officers were court martialed. However, an official inquiry exonerated the 368th Regiment of any cowardice and ascribed failure due to poor training, poor equipment, poor logistical support, and scapegoating. The division was deactivated in February 1919. Regardless, an Army War College board in 1925 saw fit to judge their behavior as proving the inferiority of black soldiers, the need to segregate units by race, and the justification of limits on black officers by position and rank. It was a blueprint for continued institutional racism in the interwar period.
The division was reactivated on 15 October 1942. The preconceived notions of the War College study bore fruit. The division was once again organized as a segregated unit under white leadership. It deployed overseas two years later in the Italian North Apennines and Po Valley under General Edward Almond. However, Almond performed poorly and blamed this on his African American troops; he advised the army against using African American soldiers as combat troops. Once again, many historians assess their poor performance was due to the racism of senior officers who discredited black soldiers to exonerate their own record; institutional deficiencies within the Army as to recruitment, training, and leadership were downplayed. The division was deactivated on 28 November 1945 at Fort McClellan, Alabama.
The men of the 92d Infantry Division were not well served by the Army which recruited them, the Army which “trained” them, the Army which “supplied” them, or the officers who “led” them. Two soldiers from the division were awarded the Medal of Honor: Vernon J. Baker and John R. Fox. Both received their delayed awards in 1997, over 50 years after their heroic actions in World War II, following a review that found systemic racial discrimination had prevented Black soldiers from receiving the honor sooner. The men of the 92d Division deserve recognition on the Wall of Honor at the National Museum of the US Army.
